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Abstract
While auction theory views bids and valuations as continuous variables, real-world
auctions are necessarily discrete. In this paper, we use a combination of analytical and
computational methods to investigate whether incorporating discreteness substantially
changes the predictions of auction theory, focusing on the case of uniformly distributed
valuations so that our results bear on the majority of auction experiments. In some
cases, we find that introducing discreteness changes little. For example, the first-price
auction with two bidders and an even number of values has a symmetric equilibrium
that closely resembles its continuous counterpart and converges to its continuous coun-
terpart as the discretisation goes to zero. In others, however, we uncover discontinuity
results. For instance, introducing an arbitrarily small amount of discreteness into the
all-pay auction makes its symmetric, pure-strategy equilibrium disappear; and appears
(based on computational experiments) to rob the game of pure-strategy equilibria al-
together. These results raise questions about the continuity approximations on which
auction theory is based and prompt a re-evaluation of the experimental literature.
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1 Introduction
In auction theory, bids and valuations are typically viewed as continuous variables. That
is to say, the theory assumes that players may bid any non-negative real number; and that
valuations are continuously distributed over some subset of the real line. In actual auctions,
however, both valuations and bids are discrete. For example, a participant in an auction
would never be able to submit a bid of
√
2 pounds; and
√
2 pounds could never be the most
that a participant is willing to pay for an object (i.e. their ‘valuation’). This raises a simple
question: does introducing discreteness into standard game theoretic models of auctions
substantially change their predictions?
Surprisingly, this question has received very little attention from economists. In the the-
oretical literature, there are some papers that examine the case of discrete valuations but
continuous bids; and some others that examine the case of discrete bids but continuous val-
uations.1 However, there are far fewer that consider the case of discrete bids and discrete
valuations. Moreover, those papers that do are interested in questions that are very different
from ours. For instance, Dekel and Wolinsky (2003) introduce discrete values and bids in
order to study the implications of rationalisability (whereas we focus on equilibrium); and
in any case their results rest on the assumption that the number of bidders is very large.2
The question is also almost completely ignored in the experimental literature. In this litera-
ture, it is standard for experimenters to begin by writing down a continuous auction model
and to then ‘test’ the predictions of this model using a discrete laboratory experiment. It
is occasionally asserted, without any real justification, that the discreteness makes little dif-
ference if the number of possible valuations is large (see, e.g., Noussair and Silver (2006),
footnote 3). More often, however, the fact that discrete games are being used to test a
continuous theory is not even discussed (see, e.g., Coppinger et al. (1980); Cox et al. (1982);
Kagel and Levin (1985); Dyer et al. (1989); Chen and Plott (1998); Filiz-Ozbay and Ozbay
(2007); Kirchkamp and Reiß (2011)).3 This is potentially concerning: if discrete equilib-
ria are importantly different from continuous equilibria, then these experimental tests are
invalid.
1For discrete valuations and continuous bids, see Maskin and Riley (1985), Riley (1989), Wang (1991),
Che and Gale (2006) and Bergemann et al. (2017). For discrete bids and continuous valuations, see Chwe
(1989), Rothkopf and Harstad (1994), David et al. (2007), Cai et al. (2010) and Gonc¸alves and Ray (2017).
2There are also some papers which analyse the equilibria of auctions with discrete bids and known
valuations (Boudreau, 2011; Li, 2017). Our interest, however, lies in the case where valuations are uncertain.
3An important exception is a paper by Goeree et al. (2002) that carefully analyses the equilibria of their
experimental auction game. While their analysis is insightful, the case they consider (2 bidders, 6 possible
valuations, 1 auction structure) is obviously a rather special one and could not (and is not intended to) shed
very much light on the general case.
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In this paper, we make substantial progress in answering this question through study of a
discretised version of the canonical independent private values model. We assume that values
and bids are restricted to the same finite and evenly spaced set (a fairly common set-up in
the experimental literature, although not one that may be universally applied). We allow
the discretisation to be arbitrarily fine (so that the difference between the bids can be as
small as a penny). We then study the equilibria of three standard auction structures: the
first-price, second-price and all-pay auctions. We also consider two different tie-breaking
rules: fair tie-breaking (in which tying winners are chosen randomly) and the case in which
players cannot win through a tie. While the former assumption is more popular in auction
experiments, the latter is easier to study analytically. Ultimately, though, our results do not
substantially hinge on which tie-breaking rule we assume.
We begin the analysis by considering the second-price auction. The central insight from
classical auction theory – that bidders should submit bids equal to their valuation – applies
in our discrete setting. Thus, introducing discreteness makes essentially no difference in the
second-price auction, a fact which confirms the intuition of the many experimenters who
have attempted to test the continuous theory using discrete laboratory auctions (Coppinger
et al. (1980); Cox et al. (1982); Kagel and Levin (1993); Aseff (2004); Andreoni et al. (2007);
Cooper and Fang (2008); Drichoutis et al. (2015); Georganas et al. (2017)).
We then turn to the first-price auction and begin by proving some useful lemmas that hold
regardless of the distribution that generates each players valuation. First, we show that bids
are weakly increasing in values. Second, we show that symmetric equilibria cannot have
jumps (for example, a situation in which bids jump from 3 to 5 when the valuation increases
from 10 to 11). Finally, we show that if a discrete auction has a symmetric pure-strategy
equilibrium, then it is (essentially) unique.
Using these results, we then study the equilibria of the first-price auction, focusing on the
case of uniformly distributed valuations so that our results speak to the majority of auction
experiments. In some cases (for example, with two bidders and an even number of values), we
find that the auction can possess an equilibrium which is almost identical to the equilibrium in
the continuous case and converges to the continuous equilibrium as the discreteness vanishes.
In other cases, however, we uncover discontinuities. For example, with three or more bidders
and a suitable tie breaking rule, the auction has no symmetric, pure-strategy equilibria – in
sharp contrast to the continuous case.
We then conduct a similar analysis of the all-pay auction. In this case, we once again find
dramatic contrasts between our discrete games and their continuous counterparts (which are
2
characterised by symmetric pure-strategy equilibria). Indeed, there are now no symmetric,
pure-strategy equilibria at all – a result that holds regardless of the number of bidders,
tie-breaking rule and the fineness of the discretisation. Like our results for the first-price
auction, this reveals a discontinuity in the set of equilibria (as the discretisation goes to 0)
and contradicts assertions by experimenters about the equilibria of the games they study.
In principle, discrete auctions could have asymmetric equilibria that closely resemble the
symmetric equilibria of their continuous counterparts. To investigate this possibility, we
take a computational approach, writing down our games in normal form and computing
their equilibria using standard solvers. Doing so is computationally challenging since the
number of possible strategies quickly becomes very large (e.g. in one game whose equilibria
we ultimately compute, each player has ten billion possible bidding functions to choose
from). Nonetheless, we are able to significantly reduce the dimensionality of our problem
through iterative deletion of dominated bids and thus compute the equilibria of a series of
representative auction games.
In some cases (e.g. the first-price auction with 3 bidders), we do find asymmetric equilibria
that closely resemble the symmetric equilibria of continuous theory. In general, however,
the message of our computational results reinforces our analytical findings about symmetric
equilibria. For almost all types of auction game that we consider, we find examples in which
the auction has no pure-strategy equilibria (symmetric or otherwise). This further reinforces
the contrast between the discrete and the continuous case.
Finally, we ask if it is possible to preserve the predictions of continuous theory by discretising
values and bids differently. We show that this is possible: for any continuous auction, there
exists an analogous discrete auction in which players bid as they would in the continuous
equilibrium. This result could be useful to experimenters who wish to calculate discrete
equilibria using results from continuous theory. We stress, however, that this does not mean
that discrete auctions are similar to continuous auctions in general: there is absolutely no
reason to suppose that the values and bids in actual or experimental auctions are discretised
in exactly the way that allows for application of our result.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the (family of) mod-
els under consideration. Sections 3 – 6 present the results for our three auction structures.
Section 7 explains how continuous equilibria can be preserved through discretising the bids
and values in a different way. Finally, Section 8 concludes by discussing the implications of
our findings for experimental and theoretical research.
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2 The Model
We consider n ≥ 2 bidders who compete for a single and indivisible object. Bidder i’s value
for this object vi is drawn from the finite set X = {0, δ, 2δ, ..., xδ} for some δ > 0 and x ∈ N.
Without loss of generality, assume that every element in X is drawn with strictly positive
probability; and (with some redundancy) let S ≡ x+ 1 denote the number of elements in X.
As usual, bidders know their own valuation but only the joint distribution of the values of
the other bidders. Valuations are private and independently drawn. In addition, we assume
that player i’s bid bi must belong to X (a common situation in the experimental literature,
and one which plausibly applies to many non-experimental auctions).
In all auction structures that we consider, a player who submits a bid that is strictly higher
than all opponent bids wins the auction. We consider two different rules that come into play
in the event that two or more bids tie for highest. In the model without ties, players win
the auction if and only if their bid is strictly higher than all the bids submitted by their
opponents. Thus, P(i wins) = P(bi > bj ∀j 6= i). In the model with ties, a player can win
if they tie with others who also submit the highest bid. Specifically, if m players submit
the highest bid, they all have an equal chance (1/m) of being selected as the winner. This
means, for example, that P(i wins) = P(bi > bj) + 0.5P(bi = bj) in the case of n = 2.
Of course, bidder payoffs do depend on the auction structure. In the first-price auction,
the player who submits the highest bid wins the object and pays a price equal to their
bid. Thus, the expected payoff of a bidder with a value vi and submits a bid of bi is
pi(vi, bi) = (vi − bi)P(i wins). In the all-pay auction, players pay their bid even if they lose.
Hence, pi(vi, bi) = viP(i wins) − bi. In the second-price auction, the player who submits
the highest bid wins the object but pays a price equal to second highest bid. We assume
throughout that bidders are risk-neutral and therefore maximise their expected payoff.
Bidder’s i’s (ex-ante) strategy is a function βi : X → X mapping from each valuation they
might have to a (permissible) bid. We define an equilibrium as a set of bidding functions,
one for each player, such that each player’s bidding function maximises their expected payoff
given the bidding functions of the other players. (This is equivalent to a pure-strategy Bayes-
Nash equilibrium with risk-neutral bidders.) When all bidders choose the same bidding
function, we say that the equilibrium is symmetric. We focus on symmetric, pure-strategy
equilibria since these equilibria characterise the continuous case – and the point of the exercise
is to see how discrete equilibria compare to this benchmark.
Finally, we restrict attention to equilibria in undominated strategies (i.e. equilibria in which
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players never choose strategies which are weakly dominated). While this might seem re-
strictive, this cannot rule out any of the equilibria considered in the standard analysis of
continuous auctions (since these are in undominated strategies). In addition, the restriction
is easy to motivate: for example, players will never choose dominated strategies if their
opponents ‘tremble’ with arbitrarily low probability (Selten, 1975). Since we only consider
equilibria in undominated strategies, we omit the phrase in undominated strategies when
stating our results.
3 The Second Price Auction
To begin with, we consider the second-price auction. Here the analysis is fairly trivial, as
the following proposition indicates.4
Proposition 1 In the model with ties, each player sets β(v) = v in the unique equilibrium.
In the model without ties, the set of equilibria is precisely the set of strategy profiles in which
each player sets either β(v) = v or β(v) = v + δ.
The point here is that in any equilibrium (in undominated strategies), players bid their
valuation (or perhaps their valuation plus δ). Of course, players also bid their valuation in
the unique equilibrium in undominated strategies of the continuous model. Thus, introducing
discreteness makes essentially no difference in the second-price auction, a fact which confirms
the intuition of the many experimenters who have attempted to test the continuous theory
using a discrete laboratory auction. Since the analysis of the second-price auction is so
straightforward, we quickly move on to our next auction structure.
4 The First-Price Auction
We begin our analysis of the first-price auction with some useful lemmas that hold indepen-
dently of the distribution that generates the players valuations.
Lemma 1 The set of equilibria does not depend on δ.
Since our interest is in equilibria, Lemma 1 allows us normalise δ = 1 without loss of
generality. In other words, we may view the bids and values as integers and strategies as a
map from some set of consecutive integers to itself. This is not very surprising: obviously
4All proofs are collected in the appendix.
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there is no important distinction between the game in which players bid 2δ when their value is
3δ, and the game in which they bid 2 when their value is 3. Holding the number of valuations
and bids fixed, the only effect of varying δ is to induce a (positive) linear transformation in
the payoffs. Throughout the following, then, we will set δ = 1.
Lemma 2 (No Dominated Strategies.) Suppose that a bidding function β is chosen in
an equilibrium. In the model with ties, β(0) = 0 and β(v) ≤ v−1 for all v ≥ 1. In the model
without ties, β(0) = 0, β(1) ≤ 1 and β(v) ≤ v − 1 for all v ≥ 2.
Roughly speaking, Lemma 2 rules out bids that exceed valuations: such bids are weakly
dominated. As a result, it pins down bidding behaviour at the ‘start’ of the bidding function
(e.g., when v = 0) in a similar way to the boundary condition of continuous theory. As it will
turn out, these low bids then pin down bids for higher valuations by inductive arguments.
Thus, the assumption that players avoid dominated strategies will prove crucial for the
analysis.
Lemma 3 (Monotonicity.) Suppose that a bidding function β is chosen in an equilibrium.
Then for all v, v′ ∈ X, v′ > v implies that β(v′) ≥ β(v).
Lemma 3 states that equilibrium bids must be (weakly) increasing in valuations. While this
must hold in equilibrium, it is perhaps worth noting that it holds more generally. To be
more precise, suppose that the player believes that there is a strictly positive probability
that they will win by submitting a bid of β(v′). Then, regardless of whether they expect
their opponents to play equilibrium strategies, their optimal bid cannot decrease when their
valuation increases from v to v′. In other words, the monotonicity property arises more from
the logic of best responses than from equilibrium reasoning.
We now examine some of the properties of symmetric equilibria (henceforth, SE), which
are characterised by a single bidding function β. To begin with, note that, in the model
without ties, an SE cannot have jumps (i.e. a situation in which the bid jumps from b to
some b′ ≥ b + 2 when the valuation increases from v to v + 1). To see this, suppose (for
contradiction) that there were such an SE and consider what would happen if a player with
a value of v + 1 were to deviate by reducing their bid to b + 1. The deviation would not
reduce their probability of winning: both before the deviation and after it, they win the
auction if and only if the highest bid of their opponents is less than or equal to b. Obviously,
however, it would increase their payoff in the event that they did win. Finally, since they
had a strictly positive probability of winning in an SE (e.g. whenever their opponents all bid
b), the deviation would strictly increase their expected payoff, contradicting the supposed
optimality of their strategy in the candidate SE. We thus have the following result.
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Lemma 4 (No jumps) Suppose that β is an SE bidding function in the model without ties.
Then for all v, b ∈ X, β(v) = b implies that β(v + 1) ≤ b+ 1 (provided that v + 1 ∈ X).
It is not as straightforward to prove a corresponding lemma in a model with ties. The reason
is that the reduction in a players bid from b′ to b+ 1 now does reduce the players probability
of winning: for instance, it eliminates their chance of winning when their opponents all bid b′.
Nonetheless, we are able to prove qualified versions of this lemma for particular distributions
of player valuations (see Lemma 13 for the details).
Finally, we prove a uniqueness result.
Lemma 5 In the model without ties, the SE (if it exists) is unique up to a choice of β(1).
Lemma 5 states that, in the model without ties, the SE (if it exists) is uniquely implied by
the choice of β(1). Since players avoid dominated strategies, either β(1) = 0 or β(1) = 1.
Hence, there are at most two SE in the first-price auction. In some cases, the choice of
β(1) makes no difference to higher bids, so the SE is essentially unique. In others, however,
changing β(1) has implications for bids further up the chain – a fact that will be illustrated
by the next proposition.
Using these results, we now examine the equilibria of the first-price auction. To do so, we
will now assume that the values are uniformly distributed. The reasons are twofold. First,
this distribution is by far most the popular choice by auction experimenters (Kagel, 1995;
Kagel and Levin, 2011); so its analysis is of particular importance if we wish to interpret
their results. Second, it turns out that it is impossible to say very much about the existence
of SE for arbitrary distributions. Thus, some distributional choice is necessary.
We begin with the case of 2 bidders in the model without ties.
Proposition 2 In the first-price auction with two bidders and without ties, there are exactly
two SE: β(v) = bv/2c and β(v) = dv/2e.
Proposition 2 demonstrates that continuous auction theory can be an extremely good ap-
proximation to discrete reality. In the continuous case, players set β(v) = v/2. In the
discrete case, they also bid half their value when possible and they round their bid to the
one of the two closest integers otherwise. (In one SE, they round up; in the other, they
round down.) Thus, the difference between continuous and discrete case can be extremely
small (e.g. if the bids and values are discretised in pennies) and the difference vanishes as
the discretisation goes to 0. That is,
Corollary 6 In any SE with two bidders and without ties, bidding functions and expected
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revenues converge to their counterparts in the continuous auction as δ → 0.
Unfortunately, however, this happy state of affairs ceases to be once we introduce addi-
tional bidders (while maintaining our previous assumption about ties). In fact, we have the
following rather striking result:
Proposition 3 Suppose that n ≥ 3 and that the maximum x satisfies
x >
2
1
n−1
2
1
n−1 − 1
. (1)
Then there are no SE in the first-price auction without ties.
To illustrate the argument, we sketch a proof for the case of n = 3. To begin, we study the
start of the bidding function. By Lemma 2, β(0) = 0, β(1) ≤ 1 , and β(2) = 1. Furthermore,
it is easy to check that β(3) = 2 in any SE (if this were not true, i.e. β(3) = 1, it would then
pay for a bidder with a value of 3 to deviate to a bid of 2.)
Of particular interest is the bid when v = 4. By monotonicity and no jumps, there are only
two possibilities: β(4) = 2 and β(4) = 3. Let us consider these possibilities in turn. In the
first instance, suppose that β(4) = 2. In that case, a player with a value of 4 would win
in equilibrium whenever both of their opponents values were 2 or lower. Since there are 3
such values, their equilibrium (expected) pay-off would be 2(3/S)2 where S is the number of
possible valuations. However, if the player were to deviate by bidding 3, they would win (at
least) whenever their opponents values were 4 or lower. Since there are 5 such values, their
payoff would be at least (5/S)2 > 2(3/S)2. Since the deviation would be strictly profitable,
we cannot have β(4) = 2 in an SE.
Let us then consider the second possibility: β(4) = 3. In that case, a player with a value
of 4 would win in equilibrium whenever their opponents values were both 3 or lower. Since
there are 4 such values, their equilibrium pay-off would be (4/S)2. However, if the player
were to deviate by bidding 2, they would win whenever their opponents values were both 2
or lower and therefore get an expected pay-off of 2(3/S)2 > (4/S)2. Thus, we also cannot
have β(4) = 3 in an SE. Since these were the only 2 possibilities, this means that there is no
SE in the case of n = 3.
We now briefly remark on the assumption about the number of possible values. As noted,
the argument assumes that inequality (1) holds; i.e., that the number of valuations is large
relative to the number of bidders. In our view, this is a reasonable requirement that is
satisfied by virtually all real world and experimental auctions. If there are 1000 possible
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values (a fairly common strategy space in experiments), all this requires is that the number
of bidders is fewer than 693. Even if the number of possible values is just 100, all this
requires is that the number of bidders is fewer than 70. As an aside, we note that there is
an SE in the very high bidder case in which each player bids 0 when v = 0 and β(v) = v− 1
otherwise. This last observation, incidentally, is consistent with the finding of Dekel and
Wolinsky (2003) that an extremely large number of bidders can induce players to bid almost
entirely their valuation.
It might be wondered whether this non-existence result survives as soon as ties are intro-
duced. In fact, non-existence is common under either tie breaking rule (see the appendix for
our full analysis of this case). Indeed, in some cases, allowing for ties can make things even
worse. For example, in the case of 2 bidders (which had an SE in the no-ties case), SE now
fail to exist if the number of possible values is odd.
In general, these results contradict assertions found in a number of experimental papers. For
example, Cox et al. (1982) experimentally simulate a first-price auction with two bidders,
an odd number of values and fair tie-breaking; and assert (based on a lengthy discussion
of the continuous case) that has a symmetric, pure strategy equilibrium (see their equation
3.5). As it turns out, however, their games have no SE at all – and therefore cannot have
the particular SE that they identify.
5 The All-Pay Auction
We now turn to the all-pay auction. As before, we begin with some useful lemmas.
Lemma 7 The set of equilibria is invariant to δ.
Lemma 8 (No Dominated Strategies.) Suppose that a bidding function β is chosen in
an equilibrium. Then β(0) = 0 and β(v) ≤ v − 1 for all v ≥ 1.
Lemma 9 (Monotonicity.) Suppose that a bidding function β is chosen in an equilibrium.
Then v′ > v implies that β(v′) ≥ β(v).
Lemma 10 (No jumps) Suppose that β is an SE bidding function in the model without
ties. Then if β(v) = b, β(v + 1) ≤ b+ 1.
Lemma 11 In the model without ties, the SE (if it exists) is unique.
In general, the logic behind these results is very similar to that in the first-price auction. We
pause, however, to note one minor contrast. In the all-pay auction, restricting attention to
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undominated strategies implies that β(0) = β(1) = 0. Thus there is no longer a choice to be
made about the bid when v = 1. When we combine this with the inductive argument used
to establish Lemma 5, we see that the all-pay auction has at most one SE (in undominated
strategies) while the first-price auction had at most two.
These preliminaries out of the way, we examine the existence of symmetric equilibria, again
assuming uniformly distributed valuations so that our results speak to the majority of ex-
perimental auctions. In this case, we find an even more dramatic contrast between discrete
auctions and their continuous counterparts:
Proposition 4 Suppose that x ≥ 10. Then, regardless of the number of bidders and tie-
breaking rule, there are no SE in the all-pay auction.
To (very partially) illustrate the logic of the argument, consider the case of the model without
ties and let n = 2. Where previously we studied the start of the bidding function, now we
study the end. By Lemmas 9 and 10, there are only a limited number of ways in which the
bidding function can end. For example, it might be flat over the last three values or it might
twice increase. It turns out, however, that no matter how it ends, no bidding function is a
best response to itself. For example, if one bidder increased their bid twice, then the other
should reduce their bid by 1 when their value is the maximum.
As before, Proposition 4 contradicts assertions by experimenters that discrete all-pay auc-
tions are characterised by pure-strategy SE. For example, Noussair and Silver (2006) conduct
an experimental all-pay auction with n = 6, 1000 possible bids/values and a fair tie breaking
rule. While recognising that their game is discrete, they claim that it possesses the pure-
stategy SE of continuous theory since the number of possible bids/values is large. In fact,
we see that the situation is the opposite: it is precisely because the number of values is large
that a pure-strategy SE does not exist.5 Moreover, Proposition 4 corrects their claim (see
footnote 3) that discrete auction games differ from their continuous counterparts because in
the discrete case there is a strictly positive probability of winning through a tie. In fact, our
difference arises even in the model without ties (when winning through a tie is impossible).
6 Asymmetric Equilibria
In principle, discrete auctions could have asymmetric equilibria that closely resemble the
symmetric equilibria of their continuous counterparts. To investigate this possibility, we
5In cases with a handful of possible bids and valuations, it is easy to verify that SE do exist. For instance,
if x = 2, then (regardless of the number of bidders) there is an SE in which β(0) = 0, β(1) = 0 and β(2) = 1.
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take a computational approach, first representing the games in normal form and then finding
their equilibria using standard solvers (McKelvey et al., 2014). Since Bayesian games can
be represented in sequence form, this approach is not computationally efficient (von Stengel,
1996). However, the normal form representation allows us to apply standard algorithms
which are guaranteed to find all pure-strategy equilibria and therefore establish the non-
existence of pure-strategy equilibria in cases where the algorithmic search is unsuccessful.
Computing the equilibria of discrete auctions is challenging since the number of possible
strategies is so large. Indeed, in a game with k possible bids and valuations, each player has
kk pure strategies (so the number of strategies grows super-exponentially). Nonetheless, we
are able to significantly reduce the dimensionality of our problem through iterated deletion
of dominated strategies. In the first stage, we delete strategies that involve bids above
valuations since these strategies are weakly dominated. In subsequent stages, we iteratively
delete strategies that are now strictly dominated (see Appendix C for the full details). In
other words, we delete strategies using the Dekel-Fudenberg procedure (Dekel and Fudenberg,
1990). While not designed for this purpose, this procedure is guaranteed to preserve all
equilibria in undominated strategies.6 Furthermore, it reduces the number of strategies
quite dramatically and therefore allows us to construct payoff matrices with hundreds of
thousands of entries where previously the number of entries would have run into the billions.
We then compute the equilibria of a variety of auction games. We vary the auction structure
(first-price vs. all-pay), number of bidders (two vs. three), tie breaking rule and number
of possible valuations. Throughout, we assume uniformly distributed values. In general, we
avoid searching for equilibria in cases where we have already identified symmetric equilibria
analytically (see Sections 4 – 5).7
In some cases, we do find asymmetric equilibria that closely resemble the symmetric equilibria
of continuous theory. For example, consider a first-price auction with three bidders and no-
ties; and suppose that the number of valuations is not a multiple of three. Then (generalising
one of our computational results) it easy to check that there is an asymmetric equilibrium in
which players submit bids that are very close to the continuous equilibrium of β(v) = 2v/3
(see Figure 1 for an illustration).8 In this case, the discrete auction lacks symmetric equilibria
6Clearly, the first round must preserve all equilibria in undominated strategies. Moreover, the subsequent
rounds (in which strictly dominated strategies are deleted) are guaranteed to preserve all equilibria (in
undominated strategies or otherwise).
7Our code is available here: https://github.com/cptanalatriste/bayesian-game-builder
8Let m denote an arbitrary multiple of 3. In this equilibrium, the first bidder sets β(0) = β(1) = 0 and
then β(m) = 2m/3, β(m− 1) = β(m)− 1 and β(m+ 1) = β(m) + 1 (for all m ≥ 3). The second bidder sets
β(0) = β(1) = 0, β(2) = 1, β(3) = β(4) = 2; and then β(m − 1) = β(m) = β(m + 1) = 2m/3. The third
bidder sets β(0) = β(1) = 0, β(2) = 1, β(3) = 2; and then sets β(m) = β(m− 1) = β(m− 2) = 2m/3− 1.
11
(by Proposition 3), but allowing for asymmetry provides a way of recovering continuous
results.
Figure 1: An asymmetric equilibrium with n = 3
Notes: Figure 1 plots the asymmetric equilibrium discussed in the text for
the case of x = 14. The dotted line depicts the continuous equilibrium of
β(v) = 2v/3.
In general, however, the analysis further emphasises the discontinuities highlighted in the
previous section. Indeed, in six out of the seven types of auction game that we consider,
we find examples in which the auction has no strategy equilibria whatsoever (see appendix
Tables 1 and 2 for the full results). While we were only able to solve relatively small
auctions, we conjecture (based on the results of Sections 4 – 5) that non-existence would
also be common for auctions with larger numbers of values.
7 Playing with the Discretisation
The previous analysis assumes that bids and valuations are discretised in the same way.
While this is a natural assumption in many settings (and applies to many experimental
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auctions), an obvious question is whether the results of continuous theory can be preserved
through altering the discretisation. In fact, it turns out that they can: for any continuous
auction, there exists a discrete auction in which individuals bid just as they would in the
continuous equilibrium.
More precisely, consider a continuous auction in which each player’s (private) valuation
is independently drawn from the same continuous cumulative distribution function FC with
support [v, v¯], bids are allowed to be any real number and there is a symmetric equilibrium in
which each player chooses the same strictly increasing bidding function βC : [v, v¯]→ R+. Let
us now construct a discrete analogue of this auction. First, choose some δ > 0 and construct
a discrete distribution FD over the set V = {v − δ, v, ..., v¯ − δ} using FD(v) = FC(v + δ)
for any v ∈ V (so that FD(v − δ) = 0 and FD(v¯ − δ) = 1). In other words, construct a
step-function by evaluating the continuous distribution FC at all valuations v, v + δ, ..., v¯
and then shift the step-function slightly to the left. Second, restrict the bids that players
may submit to the set B = {βC(v), βC(v + δ), ..., βC(v¯)}; that is, to the bids that would be
submitted in continuous equilibrium. Third, specify that players cannot win in the event of
a tie.9 We then have the following result.
Proposition 5 In the first-price and all-pay auctions without ties, there is an SE in which
each player bids βC(v) for all v ∈ V.
This result provides experimenters with a way of testing continuous theory. For example,
suppose that an experimenter wants to test the theorys predictions for a first-price auction
with uniformly distributed values. In the continuous case with values distributed on [0, v¯],
equilibrium bidding is given by
β(v) =
(
n− 1
n
)
v.
It is easy to check that a discrete analogue of this distribution (in the sense of Proposition 5)
is a discrete uniform distribution on {0, n, 2n, ..., v¯−n}. To test the theory, the experimenter
can therefore make the set of possible bids the multiples of n − 1 and specify that players
cannot win in the event of a tie. Using Proposition 5, and without the need for any calcu-
lations, they can immediately infer that their discrete game has a symmetric equilibrium in
which participants bid just as they would in the continuous case.10
9It is also possible to prove a version of Proposition 5 on the assumption that all players who submit
the highest bid win the object. Unfortunately, however, this tie-breaking rule creates a very large number of
equilibria: for instance, there is now an equilibrium in which all players bid 0 regardless of their valuation
(we owe this point to Paul Klemperer).
10A similar idea appears in Goeree et al. (2002) who test the first-price auction with n = 2 by making
the valuations the multiples of 2 and the permissible bids the integers. They do not, however, establish the
existence of a SE using the logic of Proposition 5 and instead resort to direct calculation.
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While this result may be useful for experimenters, we stress that it does not mean that
continuous auctions are similar to discrete auctions in general. As shown in Sections 4 -
5, previous auction experiments have not usually discretised bids and valuations in a way
that preserves the predictions of continuous theory. Moreover, it would be an astonishing
coincidence if the possible bids and valuations in real world auctions were discretised in
the manner of Proposition 5. For example, in the case of uniform values, 3 bidders and a
minimum bid increment of 10,000 this would require that the valuations that the bidders
could possibly have are precisely the multiples of 15,000, an assumption that would seem
almost impossible to defend or motivate.
We also note that our result is ‘tight’ in the sense that additional bids (except that those
exceeding βC(v¯)) cannot be added to the set of permissible bids B. To see this, suppose
that we did add such a bid b that lies strictly between two bids βC(vi) and βC(vj) (assume
that vi > vj without loss of generality). Then bidding βC would not be an equilibrium: for
a bidder with a valuation vi could reduce their bid from βC(vi) to b without reducing their
probability of winning (and thereby increasing their expected pay-off). This is a problem: in
order to preserve the predictions of continuous theory, there must be at least as many bids
as valuations (so players can bid as they are supposed to) – but if even one additional bid is
added, the attempt at preserving these predictions will fail.
8 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have made some progress towards understanding how auction theory
changes once bids and valuations made discrete. In some cases, we find that introducing
discreteness changes little. In others, however, we uncover discontinuity results. For exam-
ple, in the all-pay auction with uniform values, introducing an arbitrarily small amount of
discreteness makes the symmetric, pure-strategy equilibria of continuous theory disappear;
and can make the pure-strategy equilibria disappear altogether. In closing, we discuss the
implications of these discontinuity results for theoretical and experimental research.
One conclusion for auction experimenters is that auction theory cannot be straightforwardly
applied to the games they study. Indeed, ignoring the discreteness of laboratory games has
led experimenters to make a series of errors (as documented in Sections 4 - 5). In future,
experimenters may wish to discretise auctions in a way that allows for the application of our
Proposition 5. Alternately, they may wish to calculate the equilibria of their games directly,
perhaps taking a computational approach (along the lines of Section 6) or otherwise using
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our monotonicity, no-jumps and uniqueness lemmas to identify all symmetric equilibria in
auction games without ties.
For theorists, the implications are rather different. Over the last few decades, considerable
effort has been expended in attempting to establish the existence of pure-strategy equilibria
in successively more general auction models (see Maskin and Riley (2000), Athey (2001) and
Reny and Zamir (2004) for notable examples). As our findings make clear, however, the
existence of pure-strategy equilibria is far from guaranteed as soon as bids and valuations
are made discrete. This is an issue since, as noted, discreteness is an inevitable feature of
any real world or experimental auction and continuity approximations can be justified (only)
as harmless assumptions that ease the analysis without substantially changing the results.
Of course, the games we study do have equilibria: this is an immediate consequence of
Harsanyi (1967) and Nash et al. (1950). The upshot, however, is that these equilibria are
often in mixed strategies. The question then arises of whether it is plausible to suppose
that players really do randomise when bidding in auctions (and in just the way required by
auction theory) even though they have no strict incentive to do so. While we cannot address
this question in full, we briefly note three points that may be relevant.
First, the ‘classical’ justification of mixed strategies – that are necessary to keep opponents
guessing about what a player will do (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1947) – would appear
to have even less force than usual in this context (see Rubinstein (1991) for a general criticism
of this type of justification). In auction games with plausible type spaces, individuals will
already have very little idea about their opponents valuation. Thus, even if they somehow
knew their opponents bidding functions, they would already have substantial uncertainty
about their opponents bids. That is to say, it is not clear that people would ever feel the
need to submit random bids in order to ‘keep their opponents guessing’.
Second, even if individuals do make decisions randomly in some contexts – as suggested, for
instance, by Chiappori et al. (2002) – it is not clear that they do so in auction contexts. Of
course this is an empirical question and one that should be tested by empirical studies of
auction behaviour. Nonetheless, we conjecture that the results of such studies will find little
evidence of random bidding by auction participants.
Third, introducing randomisation would appear to increase the cognitive requirements pre-
supposed by equilibrium models. In a pure-strategy Bayes-Nash equilibrium, players are
assumed to (i) know the joint distribution of opponent valuations, (ii) know which bidding
functions their opponents have chosen, (iii) infer the joint distribution of opponent bids, (iv)
infer the distribution of the highest opponent bid, and finally (v) calculate the optimal bid
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taking this distribution as given.11 Once we introduce randomisation, this already difficult
task becomes even harder. For now, players need to combine their opponents’ probability
distribution over bidding functions with their probability distribution over valuations in or-
der to arrive at the distribution over bids (in addition to all the other steps). In other words,
players now best respond to two sources of randomness: random valuations and random bid-
ding functions. It is unclear whether we can expect this from even relatively sophisticated
auction participants.
It seems, then, that our results should push one in the direction of greater scepticism towards
auction theory. Less controversially, however, they highlight the need for further research
on discrete auctions. Despite the large number of papers on auction theory, the world of
discrete auctions remains almost completely unexplored. We hope that the results of this
paper – along with our monotonicity, uniqueness and no-jumps lemmas – will stimulate and
provide the basis for further work in this area.
11Technically speaking, these steps are sufficient but not necessary for individuals to play a Bayes-Nash
equilibrium. For instance, they might hold incorrect beliefs about their opponents’ decision rules, fail to
optimise correctly and then submit equilibrium bids because these mistakes end up cancelling out. In
practice, however, it is very hard to see why anyone would ever play a Bayes-Nash equilibrium without
proceeding through these steps.
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9 Tables
The following tables summarise our computational results on the existence of pure-strategy
Bayes-Nash equilibria. The first column (‘Valuations’) specifies the number of possible val-
uations and bids in the game. The subsequent columns specify the auction structure and
number of bidders. An entry of ‘yes’ means that a pure-strategy Bayes-Nash equilibrium
exists; an entry of ‘no’ means that it does not. A blank entry means that we did not search
for the equilibrium (either because we had around found symmetric equilibria analytically
or because the payoff matrices were too large for this to be computationally feasible).
Table 1: The existence of pure-strategy equilibria in the model with ties
Valuations FPSB, n = 2 FPSB, n = 3 All-pay, n = 2 All-pay, n = 3
6 - Yes Yes No
7 - No No No
8 - Yes No -
9 - - Yes -
10 No - - -
Table 2: The existence of pure-strategy equilibria in the model without ties
Valuations FPSB, n = 2 FPSB, n = 3 All-pay, n = 2 All-pay, n = 3
6 - Yes Yes Yes
7 - Yes No No
8 - - No -
9 - - Yes -
10 - - - -
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Appendix A. Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. In the model with ties, a standard argument establishes that the
bidding function β(v) = v weakly dominates all other bidding functions. Thus, each player
sets β(v) = v in the unique equilibrium in undominated strategies.
In the model without ties, the strategies β(v) = v and β(v) = v + δ necessarily yield the
same payoff (the only difference is that bidding v+δ allows a player to win when the highest
bid of their opponents is v; but in that case the payoff from winning is zero). Furthermore,
a standard argument establishes that β(v) = v and β(v) = v + δ weakly dominate all other
bidding functions. Thus, the set of equilibria in undominated strategies is precisely the set
of strategy profiles in which each player sets either β(v) = v or β(v) = v + δ. 
Proof of Lemma 1. Consider the game in which bids and values are restricted to
X = {0, δ, 2δ, ..., xδ} for some δ > 0. Thus, each player i has a value of δvi for some
vi ∈ {0, 1, ..., x} ≡ X′ and must choose to bid δbi for some bi ∈ X′. Consider initially the
model without ties. In equilibrium, each player chooses their bid δbi so that, for all b
′
i ∈ X′,
(δvi − δbi)P(win|δbi) ≥ (δvi − δb′i)P(win|δb′i)
⇐⇒ (vi − bi)P(win|δbi) ≥ (vi − b′i)P(win|δb′i)
⇐⇒ (vi − bi)P(δbi > δbj ∀j 6= i) ≥ (vi − b′i)P(δb′i > δbj ∀j 6= i)
⇐⇒ (vi − bi)P(bi > bj ∀j 6= i) ≥ (vi − b′i)P(b′i > bj ∀j 6= i).
Clearly, this inequality does not depend on δ. Thus, if there is an equilibrium in the game
with x values and discretisation δ > 0 in which player i bids bδ when her valuation is vδ,
then there is an analogous equilibrium in the game with x values and arbitrary discretisation
δ′ > 0 in which player i bids bδ′ when her valuation is vδ′. A similar argument establishes
that the set of equilibria is invariant to δ in the model with ties. 
Proof of Lemma 2. Consider first the model with ties. For all v, bidding b > v is weakly
dominated by b = 0: bidding b = 0 ensures a non-negative payoff, whereas bidding b > v
leads either to a zero payoff (if the player loses) or a negative payoff (if the player wins).
Hence, β(v) ≤ v in any equilibrium in undominated strategies; and therefore β(0) = 0.
Moreover, for any v ≥ 1, bidding b = 0 also weakly dominates bidding b = v (since bidding
b = 0 can lead to a strictly positive payoff if all other players bid 0). Thus, β(v) ≤ v − 1 for
all v ≥ 1 in any equilibrium in undominated strategies.
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Similar arguments apply in the model without ties. As before, bidding b > v is weakly
dominated by b = 0: the latter ensures a payoff of zero, whereas the former yields either
a negative or zero payoff. Hence, β(v) ≤ v for all v in any equilibrium in undominated
strategies; which implies that β(0) = 0 and β(1) ≤ 1. Suppose now that v ≥ 2. If a player
bids v, their payoff is necessarily zero. However, if they bid 1, their payoff is either zero (if
their opponents all bid 1 or more) or positive (if their opponents all bid 0). Since β(0) = 0,
there is a strictly positive probability that all opponents bid zero. Hence, bidding b = 1 now
strictly dominates b = v, which implies that β(v) ≤ v − 1 for v ≥ 2. 
Proof of Lemma 3. See Goeree et al. (2002) Proposition A1. 
Proof of Lemma 4. See the main text. 
Proof of Lemma 5. Since players avoid dominated bids, β(0) = 0 and either β(1) = 0 or
β(1) = 1. Moreover, it is obvious that β(2) = 1 in any SE. We will now argue that the SE
bidding function up to and including an arbitrary valuation v ≥ 2 uniquely determines the
SE bidding function up to and including valuation v + 1. By induction, the SE is therefore
uniquely implied by our choice of β(1).
To do this, let b denote the bid submitted when the value is v ≥ 2. By monotonicity and
no-jumps, there are only 2 possibilities when the value is v + 1:
1. β(v + 1) = b
2. β(v + 1) = b+ 1
Let us examine these possibilities in turn.
First possibility: β(v+ 1) = b. Then bidding b with a value of v+ 1 must be at least as good
as bidding b+ 1, i.e.
(v + 1− b)P(≤ b− 1)n−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
A
≥ (v − b)P(≤ b)n−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
B
where P( ≤ k) denotes the equilibrium probability that a player bids k or lower.
Second possibility: β(v + 1) = b + 1. Then bidding b + 1 with a value of v + 1 must be at
least as good as bidding b, i.e.
(v + 1− b)P′(≤ b− 1)n−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
A′
≤ (v − b)P′(≤ b)n−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
B′
Now notice that, in both cases, the equilibrium probability of submitting a bid that is b− 1
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or less is the same. That is, P(≤ b− 1) = P′(≤ b− 1) which in turn implies that A = A′.
On the other hand, the equilibrium probability of submitting a bid that is b or less does vary
across the scenarios. In the first scenario, a player with a value of v + 1 always bids b. In
the second, they never bid b and (by monotonicity) neither do players with higher values.
Therefore, P(≤ b) > P′(≤ b). Assuming that v − b > 0 – which is without loss of generality
since v ≥ 2 – this means that B > B′.
Let us now recall our two conditions (and substitute A = A′):
1. A ≥ B
2. A ≤ B′
Since B > B′, the truth of either condition implies the falsity of the other. Hence, at most
one can hold; which means that β(v + 1) is uniquely implied by β(v). By induction, this
then means that the SE (if it exists) is uniquely implied by the choice of β(1). 
Proof of Proposition 2. To demonstrate existence, we will show that if one player (say
player 2) bids according to one of the two equilibrium strategies, then the other (player 1)
can do no better than follow the same strategy.
Initially, suppose that player 2 sets β2(v2) = bv2/2c. Then their bids are drawn from either
{0, 1, 2, ..., x/2} (if x is even) or {0, 1, 2, ..., (x − 1)/2} (if x is odd). First, we check that
player 1 prefers to follow the proposed equilibrium strategy than to win for sure. It is easy
to show that the case in which winning for sure is most appealing is when player 1’s value
is x (the maximum) and x is odd. In that case, player 1’s expected payoff from optimally
winning for sure (by bidding an extra 1) is
x−
(
x− 1
2
+ 1
)
=
x− 1
2
Meanwhile, player 1 wins in the candidate SE if and only if her opponent’s value is 2 (or
more) lower than hers. Thus, player 1’s equilibrium payoff is(
x− 1
x+ 1
)(
x− x− 1
2
)
This can be simplified to
x− 1
2
which is the exactly the expected payoff that player 1 would get by deviating. Therefore,
she is never strictly better off by winning for sure instead of bidding in accordance with the
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SE.
Given that we have an ‘interior’ solution, what is player 1’s optimal bid? Since player 2’s
values follow a uniform distribution, the expected payoff of player 1 from making any bid
b1 ∈ N that does not win for sure is (
2b1
x+ 1
)
(v1 − b1)
Let us write bids as deviations from the proposed equilibrium, i.e. let b1 = bv1/2c + i for
some i ∈ N . Suppose that v1 is even so that bv1/2c = v1/2. Writing b1 = v1/2 + i, player
1’s expected payoff is (
v1 + 2i
x+ 1
)(
v1 − v1
2
− i
)
This can be simplified to
v21
2(x+ 1)
− 2i
2
x+ 1
which obviously attains a strict global maximum when i = 0, confirming the optimality of
the proposed strategy.
Suppose instead that v1 is odd. Then bv1/2c = (v1 − 1)/2. Writing b1 = (v1 − 1)/2 + i,
player 1’s expected payoff is (
v1 − 1 + 2i
x+ 1
)(
v1 − v1 − 1
2
− i
)
This can be simplified to
(v1 − 1)(v1 + 1)
2(x+ 1)
+ 2i
(
1− i
x+ 1
)
If i = 0 or i = 1, the second term is zero. However, if i ≥ 2 or i ≤ −1, the second term is
negative. Thus, bidding the proposed strategy is at least as good as bidding one more and
strictly better than bidding anything else.
Since β1(v1) = bv1/2c is a best response for both odd and even v1, it is optimal for all v1 and
therefore constitutes an SE. A similar argument establishes the existence of an SE in which
each player sets β(v) = dv/2e. Finally, Lemma 5 implies that these are the only SE. 
Proof of Corollary 6. In the continuous case, the unique symmetric equilibrium is given
by β(v) = v/2. In the discrete case with discretisation δ, the SE are β(δv) = bv/2cδ and
β(δv) = dv/2eδ for all values δv ∈ X (i.e. for v = 1, 2, ..., k). Thus, the difference between
a discrete bid and continuous bid is at most δ/2 → 0 as δ → 0 (holding the valuation δv
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fixed). This establishes the (uniform) convergence of the discrete bidding function.
We now sketch a proof for the convergence of expected revenues. As δ → 0, each player’s
valuation converges in distribution to the valuation in the continuous case (i.e. a continu-
ously and uniformly distributed random variable on the interval [0, x]). By the continuous
mapping theorem, each player’s bid converges in distribution to the bid in the continuous
case (i.e. a continuously and uniformly distributed random variable on [0, x/2]). Applying
the continuous mapping theorem again, we see that the maximum bid also converges in dis-
tribution to its continuous counterpart. Finally, by the bounded convergence theorem, the
expected value of the maximum bid also converges to its continuous analogue. 
Proof of Proposition 3. Let us suppose (for contradiction) that there were an SE and
begin by studying the start of the bidding function that defines it. As before, β(0) = 0 and
β(1) = 0 or β(1) = 1 (since players avoid dominated strategies). Either way, β(2) = 1 (since
bidding 0 or 2 yield a payoff of 0 whereas bidding 1 yields a positive payoff).
Let us now consider the first value at which the bidding function does not increase. To this
end, define k as the smallest value such that β(k) = β(k−1) and k ≥ 2. First, we argue that
k must exist. For contradiction, suppose that it does not, i.e. β(v) = v − 1 for all v ≥ 2. In
equilibrium, a player with v = x would win whenever all of their opponents have values of
x− 1 or lower. Since there are x such values, and their payoff in the event of winning is 1,
their equilibrium expected payoff would be(
x
x+ 1
)n−1
If such a player were to bid one less, they would obtain an expected payoff of
2
(
x− 1
x+ 1
)n−1
which (rearranging) is strictly larger if and only if
x >
2
1
n−1
2
1
n−1 − 1
.
But this is precisely what we have assumed. Thus, if there is an SE, and a player with a value
of x does not want to deviate, then there must be some k ≥ 2 such that β(k) = β(k − 1).
Next, we locate k. In equilibrium, a player with a value v = k bids v − 2, thereby winning
whenever their opponents all have values of v− 2 or lower. Since there are v− 1 such values,
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the equilibrium expected payoff of a player with a value v = k is
2
(
v − 1
x+ 1
)n−1
If the player were to bid 1 more (i.e. were to bid v− 1), they would win (at least) whenever
their opponents all have values of v or lower. Thus, their expected payoff would be at least(
v + 1
x+ 1
)n−1
Since an equilibrium cannot have strictly profitable deviations,
2
(
v − 1
x+ 1
)n−1
≥
(
v + 1
x+ 1
)n−1
(2)
We claim that k is the smallest integer that satisfies inequality (2). To see this, notice that
for all values smaller than k, submitting the equilibrium bid β(v) = v − 1 must be at least
as good as bidding v − 2. This means that, for any v < k,
2
(
v − 1
x+ 1
)n−1
≤
(
v
x+ 1
)n−1
<
(
v + 1
x+ 1
)n−1
so such values cannot satisfy (2).
We can re-write (2) as
v ≥ 1 + 2
1
n−1
2
1
n−1 − 1
.
Since k is the smallest integer that satisfies this inequality,
k =
1 + 2
1
n−1
2
1
n−1 − 1
+ 
for some  ∈ [0, 1).
Having located k, we now consider a bidder with a value v = k − 1. By assumption, they
prefer to bid β(k − 1) = k − 2 than to bid 1 less, i.e.(
k − 1
x+ 1
)n−1
≥ 2
(
k − 2
x+ 1
)n−1
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Equivalently,
k ≤ 2(2
1
n−1 )− 1
2
1
n−1 − 1
Inserting our value for k, we find that
 ≤ 2
1
n−1 − 2
2
1
n−1 − 1
< 0
which contradicts  ≥ 0, implying that there is no SE. 
Proof of Lemmas 7 – 11. The arguments for Lemmas 7, 8, 10 and 11 are straightforward
variants on those that establish analogous lemmas in the first-price auction. Lemma 9
(monotonicity) requires a slightly different proof, something we now provide. First, since
players avoid dominated bids, β(0) = 0. Thus, bids cannot decrease when the value increases
from v = 0 to v = 1. Next, consider now the bidding function starting from v > 0 and
suppose (for contradiction) that
1. The optimal bid is B when the value is v > 0.
2. The optimal bid is b < B when the value is V > v.
From (1), bidding B must be better than bidding b with a value of v:
P(win|B)v −B ≥ P(win|b)v − b
which (since v > 0) implies that
P(win|B)− P(win|b) ≥ B − b
v
.
From (2), bidding b must be better than bidding B with a value of V :
P(win|b)V − b ≥ P(win|B)V −B
which (since V > 0 and V > v) implies that
P(win|B)− P(win|b) ≤ B − b
V
<
B − b
v
which is a contradiction. 
Proof of Proposition 4. To begin with, consider the model without ties. As a preliminary,
let us note that β(x) ≤ x − 2. The argument is straightforward. Since players avoid
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dominated bids, β(0) = β(1) = 0. Furthermore, it is easy to check that β(2) = 0 for all
n ≥ 2. Otherwise, we could have β(2) = 1, but then the expected payoff from equilibrium
bidding when v = 2 would be
2
(
2
x+ 1
)n−1
− 1 ≤ 2
(
2
5
)n−1
− 1 ≤ 2
(
2
5
)
− 1 < 0
where the first inequality uses x + 1 ≥ 5 and the second uses n ≥ 2. Since the expected
payoff is negative, the player could do better by bidding 0, confirming that β(2) 6= 1 and
therefore β(2) = 0. By no-jumps, this means that β(v) ≤ v−2 for all v ≥ 2 and in particular
for v = x.
This result in hand, we now consider two separate cases: n = 2 and n ≥ 3.
First case: n = 2. We will consider the three highest bids β(x), β(x− 1) and β(x− 2), i.e.
the ending of the bidding function. We will argue that none of the possible endings can form
part of a an SE.
Step 1. We cannot have two or more identical bids at the end, i.e. β(x) = β(x− 1).
Suppose (for contradiction) that there were two or more such bids at the end and consider
a player with v = x. If the player increased their bid by 1, the cost would be 1. Meanwhile,
the benefit would be
v∆P ≥ x
(
2
x+ 1
)
> 1
since x > 1. Since the deviation would be strictly profitable, we cannot have β(x) = β(x−1)
in an SE. (This argument implicitly assumes that β(x) ≤ x− 2; if not, the deviation would
be unprofitable.)
Step 2. We cannot have two consecutive increases, i.e. β(x) = β(x− 1) + 1 = β(x− 2) + 2.
Suppose (for contradiction) that there were two consecutive increases and consider a bidder
with v = x. If they reduced their bid by 1, the benefit would be 1. Meanwhile, the cost
would be
∆Pv = x
(
1
x+ 1
)
< 1
since x > −1. Since the deviation would be strictly profitable, we cannot have β(x) =
β(x− 1) + 1 = β(x− 2) + 2 in an SE.
Step 3. When cannot have β(x) = β(x− 1) + 1 = β(x− 2) + 1.
Suppose (for contradiction) that this did form part of an SE bidding function and consider
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a bidder with v = x − 1. If they increased their bid by 1, the cost would be 1. Meanwhile,
the benefit would be
v∆P ≥ x
(
2
x+ 1
)
> 1
since x > 3. Since the deviation would be strictly profitable, we also cannot have β(x) =
β(x− 1) + 1 = β(x− 2) + 1 in an SE.
Now, by Lemmas 2 and 3 (no gaps and monotonicity), there are only 4 ways in which the
bidding function can end:
1. β(x− 2), β(x− 2), β(x− 2)
2. β(x− 2), β(x− 2), β(x− 2) + 1
3. β(x− 2), β(x− 2) + 1, β(x− 2) + 1
4. β(x− 2), β(x− 2) + 1, β(x− 2) + 2
We can rule out the first and third possibilities since they involve two or more identical bids
at the end (Step 1). We can rule out the fourth since it involves two consecutive increases
(Step 2). By Step 3, we can rule out the second and final possibility. Since we can rule out
all of the possibilities, there is no SE when n = 2.
Second case: n ≥ 3. Here the argument is simpler: we simply show that a player with v = x
would prefer to win for sure than bid in accordance with their equilibrium strategy.
When v = x, following equilibrium yields a payoff of at most
x
(
x
x+ 1
)n−1
− β(x).
If the player were to bid an extra 1, they would get
x− β(x)− 1.
They are strictly better off winning for sure if
x− β(x)− 1 > x
(
x
x+ 1
)n−1
− β(x).
This can be simplified to
n− 1 > ln(x)− ln(x− 1)
ln(x+ 1)− ln(x) ≡ g(x)
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Assume that x ≥ 2 (i.e. there are at least 3 possible bids/values). Then it can be shown
that g(x) attains its maximum at x = 2 where g(x) ≈ 1.7. Thus, if n ≥ 3 (so n− 1 ≥ 2), it
must be that n− 1 > g(x). In other words, the bidder with the highest value would strictly
prefer to win for sure as opposed to bidding in accordance with an SE.
Next, consider the model with ties. It will be helpful to start with a simple lemma:
Lemma 12 (No jumps at the top) If n = 2 or n = 3, then β(x − 2) = b implies β(x −
1) ≤ b+ 1; and similarly, β(x− 1) = b implies β(x) ≤ b+ 1.
Proof. Consider initially the case of n = 2. Suppose (for contradiction) that there is a jump
at some value v, i.e. β(v) = b but β(v + 1) = b + m where m ≥ 2. If a player with a value
of v + 1 deviated to bidding b + m, they would gain b + m − (b + 1) = m − 1 ≥ 1 for sure.
However, they would lose (in expectation)
(v + 1)∆P = (v + 1)
P(b+m)
2
= (v + 1)
#(b+m)
2(x+ 1)
.
In equilibrium, the loss from deviating cannot exceed the gain of (at least) 1, yielding
#(b+m) ≥ 2(x+ 1)
v + 1
> 2
since v + 1 ≤ x. Thus, if there is a jump at a value v, it must be that #(b + m) > 2. But
then there cannot be a jump when the value is either x− 1 or x− 2: for in either case, there
are fewer than 2 values strictly greater than v, so necessarily #(b+m) ≤ 2.
Consider now the case of n = 3. By a similar argument, we can show that #(b + m) ≥ 2 if
there is a jump at a value v. To see this, suppose (for contradiction) that there is a jump at
v but that #(b+m) = 1. As before, the benefit from deviating to a bid of b+ 1 when your
value is v + 1 would be m− 1 ≥ 1. Meanwhile, the expected cost would be
(v + 1)∆P = (v + 1)
(
P(b+m)2
3
+ P(b+m)P(≤ b)
)
= (v + 1)P(b+m)
(
P(b+m)
3
+ P(≤ b)
)
=
v + 1
x+ 1
(
1
3(x+ 1)
+ P(≤ b)
)
≤ v + 1
x+ 1
(
1
3(x+ 1)
+
x
x+ 1
)
< 1
since v+1 < 1+x. So the cost of deviating would be smaller than the benefit, which implies
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that this cannot be an SE. Equivalently, if there is a SE with a jump at a value of v, it must
be that #(b+m) ≥ 2.
We now show how this inequality rules out jumps at the top. When v = x−1, the argument
is trivial: there is only one valuation strictly greater than v, so necessarily #(b + m) ≤ 1.
Since this contradicts #(b+m) ≥ 2, we cannot have a jump at x− 1.
Consider now the possibility of a jump when the value is x − 2. In any SE with such a
jump, #(b + m) ≥ 2 and so β(x − 1) = β(x) = b + m. But in that case, a player with a
value of x would prefer to win for sure (by bidding one more) than to bid in accordance with
equilibrium. To see this, note that such a player’s equilibrium payoff would be
x
[(
x− 1
x+ 1
)2
+
1
3
(
2
x+ 1
)2
+
(
2
x+ 1
)(
x− 1
x+ 1
)]
− β(x)
whereas they would obtain a (certain) payoff of x − β(x) − 1 by bidding one more. It can
be shown that this latter quantity is larger provided that x ≥ 2. Thus, the deviation would
be strictly profitable, implying that there is also no SE with a jump at x− 2. 
This lemma in hand, we can now demonstrate the non-existence of an SE. Consider initially
the case of n = 2. As before, we will study the last three possible bids and argue that none
of the possible sequences can form part of an SE.
Case 1 (n = 2): β(x) = β(x− 1) + 1 = β(x− 2) + 2.
Consider deviating to bidding β(x− 1) when v = x. The gain from doing so would equal 1.
Meanwhile, the (expected) cost would be
v∆P = x
(
0.5
x+ 1
+
0.5
x+ 1
)
=
x
x+ 1
< 1.
Since the cost is lower than the gain, this is a strictly profitable deviation – which means
that this sequence of bids cannot form part of an SE.
Case 2 (n = 2): β(x) = β(x− 1) = β(x− 2).
Consider bidding one more when v = x. The cost of doing so would equal 1. Meanwhile,
the (expected) benefit would be
v∆P ≥ x
(
1.5
x+ 1
)
> 1
provided that x ≥ 3. Since the benefit exceeds the cost, this is a strictly profitable deviation,
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ruling out this sequence of bids in an SE.
Case 3 (n = 2): β(x) = β(x− 1) + 1 = β(x− 2) + 1.
Consider bidding one more when v = x− 1. The cost of doing so equals 1. The (expected)
benefit is
v∆P ≥ (x− 1)
(
1
x+ 1
+
0.5
x+ 1
)
> 1
provided that x ≥ 6. Again, this is a strictly profitable deviation, which means that this is
not an SE.
Case 4 (n = 2): β(x) = β(x− 1) = β(x− 2) + 1.
Consider bidding 1 more when v = x− 2. The cost is 1, whereas the (expected) benefit is
v∆P ≥ (x− 2)
(
0.5
x+ 1
+
1
x+ 1
)
> 1
provided that x ≥ 9. So this is (once again) not an SE.
Given monotonicity and no-jumps, this exhausts all the cases, showing that there is no SE
with 2 bidders.
Consider now the case of n = 3. The argument has a similar structure to before:
Case 1 (n = 3): β(x) = β(x− 1).
In that case, a bidder would prefer to bid 1 more when v = x; in fact, this follows directly
from the proof of the previous lemma (letting m = 1).
Case 2 (n = 3): β(x) = β(x− 1) + 1.
Consider a bidder with v = x − 1 who deviates by bidding one more. The cost of doing so
is 1. Meanwhile, the expected benefit is v∆P. Before the deviation,
P(win) ≤
(
x− 1
x+ 1
)2
+
1
3
(
1
x+ 1
)2
+
(
x− 1
x+ 1
)(
1
x+ 1
)
After the deviation,
P(win) =
(
x
x+ 1
)2
+
1
3
(
1
x+ 1
)2
+
(
x
x+ 1
)(
1
x+ 1
)
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A quick calculation thus reveals that
v∆P ≥ 2vx
(x+ 1)2
=
2x(x− 1)
(x+ 1)2
> 1
provided that x ≥ 5. Thus, the benefits from bidding 1 more exceeds the costs, confirming
that this cannot comprise part of an SE. Furthermore, by monotonicity and no-jumps, these
are the only possible cases – implying that there is no SE at all.
Finally, consider the case of n ≥ 4. To begin, we find an upper bound on the probability
with which a bidder with a value of x (the maximum) can win in equilibrium. In the best
case scenario, β(x) > β(x−1), i.e. opponents with strictly lower values submit strictly lower
bids. In that case, a player with a value of x would win with probability(
x
x+ 1
)n−1
+
(
x
x+ 1
)n−2(
1
x+ 1
)(
n− 1
1
)(
1
2
)
+ . . .+
(
1
x+ 1
)n−1
1
n
since they win if all opponents have lower values (the first term), if all but one has a lower
value and they win the coin flip that decides the tie (the second term, note that this event
can happen in n−1 ways since they have n−1 opponents to tie with), ..., or finally if all their
opponents also have the maximum value but they are still chosen to win (the last term). If
we define p ≡ 1/(x+ 1), we can write the sum s(n, p) more compactly as
s(n, p) =
n∑
i=1
(1− p)n−ipi−1
(
n− 1
i− 1
)
1
i
. (3)
Let us now evaluate (3) in closed form. As a preliminary, we note that(
n− 1
i− 1
)
1
i
=
(n− 1)!
(n− i)!(i− 1)!
1
i
=
1
n
n!
(n− i)! i! =
1
n
(
n
i
)
.
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We can thus write (3) as
s(n, p) =
n∑
i=1
(1− p)n−ipi−1 1
n
(
n
i
)
=
1
np
n∑
i=1
(1− p)n−ipi
(
n
i
)
=
1
np
(
n∑
i=0
(1− p)n−ipi
(
n
i
)
− (1− p)n
)
=
1
np
(
[(1− p) + p]n − (1− p)n
)
=
1− (1− p)n
np
(4)
where the penultimate equality follows from the binomial theorem. We claim that s(n, p) is
decreasing in n. To see this, consider the difference between each term and the next, i.e.
s(n, p)− s(n+ 1, p) = 1− (1− p)
n
np
− 1− (1− p)
n+1
(n+ 1)p
=
1− (1− p)n(1 + pn)
n(n+ 1)p
. (5)
Now notice that
(1− p)−n =
∞∑
k=0
(
n+ k − 1
k
)
pk = 1 + np+ ... > 1 + np
which in turn implies that
(1− p)n(1 + np) < 1
and so the difference in (5) is positive. This means that s(n, p) > s(n+ 1, p), i.e. our upper
bound on the probability of winning falls as the number of bidders increases.
We are now in a position to make the main argument. When n = 4, we can use (4) to bound
the equilibrium expected payoff that a player with a value of x can receive. Recalling that
p ≡ 1/(x+ 1), we see that their payoff cannot exceed
x
(
1− ( x
x+1
)4
4
(
1
x+1
) )− β(x). (6)
Meanwhile, if they were to bid 1 more, they would win the auction for sure, getting
x− β(x)− 1 (7)
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It is straightforward but tedious to check that the quantity in (7) is strictly larger than the
quantity in (6) if x > 3.465. Thus, if x ≥ 4 (i.e. there are at least 5 values), the deviation is
strictly profitable; with the implication that there is no SE.
Finally, recall that s(n, p) is decreasing in the number of bidders n. Thus, if the number
of bidders rises, we can impose an even tighter upper bound on the equilibrium payoff of
a bidder with a value of x. In contrast, however, the payoff from the deviation does not
change: it is fixed at x− β(x)− 1. Hence, if the deviation is strictly profitable when n = 4,
it must also be strictly profitable for arbitrary n ≥ 4. This concludes the proof. 
Proof of Proposition 5. Consider initially a first-price auction with continuous values
and bids. If everyone bids according to β, the objective function of each player is
(v − b)P(b ≥ β(v′))n−1
= (v − b)P(β−1(b) ≥ v′)n−1
≡ (v − b)FC(β−1(b))n−1
where v′ is the value of an arbitrary opponent. Since we are assuming that β is a symmetric
equilibrium, the optimal bid b∗ must be β(v).
Consider now the discrete auction and suppose that everybody bids according to β. Since
nobody wins following a tie, the objective function of each player is
(v − b)P(b > β(v′))n−1
= (v − b)P(β−1(b) > v′)n−1
= (v − b)P(β−1(b)− δ ≥ v′)n−1
≡ (v − b)FD(β−1(b)− δ)n−1
= (v − b)FC(β−1(b))n−1
where the last equality holds for any β−1(b)− δ ∈ V = {v − δ, v, ..., v¯ − δ} and therefore for
any bid b ∈ {β(v), β(v+δ), ..., β(v¯)}, i.e. for any bid that is permissible. Thus, the objective
function is the same as in the continuous case when evaluated at any permissible bid. Since
the problem is the same, the solution must be the same: b∗ = β(v).
By a similar argument, it is possible to establish that the continuous equilibrium will also
be an discrete equilibrium in the all-pay auction. 
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Appendix B. FPSB with fair tie-breaking
In the following, we focus on the case of n = 2. To begin, we prove a qualified versions of
our no-jumps lemma:
Lemma 13 Let n = 2. Then there is no SE with a value v at which β(v − 1) = b − k but
β(v) = b for k ≥ 2 provided that β(v) ≥ (2−√3)v ≈ 0.27v.
Proof. Suppose that there is a jump in the SE bidding function, i.e. there exists a k ≥ 2,
v ∈ X and b ∈ X such that β(v − 1) = b − k but β(v) = b. Let m denote the number of
values that induce a bid of b. In equilibrium, bidding b with a value of v must be at least as
good as bidding b− 1:
pi(v, b) = (v − b)
(
v + 0.5m
S
)
≥ pi(v, b− 1) = (v − b+ 1) v
S
.
Hence,
m ≥ 2v
v − b.
If we write b = αv, our inequality becomes
m ≥ 2
1− α. (8)
Intuitively, the number of b bids (m) must be large so that the loss of probability of winning
from decreasing one’s bid is large – that way, the deviation is unprofitable.
Now, let v′ denote the maximum value that submits a bid of b (so that v′ ≡ v +m− 1). In
equilibrium, bidding b with a value of v′ must be at least as good as bidding b+ 1:
pi(v′, b) = (v′ − b)
(
v′ + 1− 0.5m
S
)
≥ pi(v′, b+ 1) ≥ (v′ − b− 1)
(
v′ + 1
S
)
Rearranging, we obtain
m ≤ 2(v
′ + 1)
v′ − b . (9)
Intuitively, the number of b bids (m) must be small so that the gain in probability from
bidding 1 more is small – this makes the deviation unprofitable.
To argue that we cannot have jumps an SE, we will claim that (8) implies the falsity of (9).
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That way, it is impossible for both inequalities to hold. To do this, we will argue that
2
1− α >
2(v′ + 1)
v′ − b ⇐⇒ v
′ > v +
1
α
− 1
(writing b = αv), which holds since
v′ ≥ v + 2
1− α
and
v +
2
1− α > v +
1
α
− 1
provided that α > 2−√3. 
Proposition 6 In the first-price auction with two bidders and an odd maximum value, there
is an SE in which β(v) = bv/2c.
Proof. The argument is essentially the same as before. The only difference is that the prob-
ability of winning is now the probability that one’s bid is strictly higher than the opponent’s
bid plus the probability that it is the same multiplied by 1/2. 
Proposition 7 With two bidders and ten or more possible values, the only possible SE is
β(v) = bv/2c.
Proof. Since players avoid dominated strategies, β(0) = 0, β(1) = 0 and β(2) = 1. Plainly,
then, β(v) = bv/2c holds up to (and including) v = 2. We will now argue that, if it holds
up to any v ≥ 2, it must hold up to v + 1. By induction, it then must hold for all v.
First case: the value is odd. Let us denote the value by 2v + 1. Since β(v) = bv/2c holds
up to the value 2v, we know that β(2v) = v (since 2v is even) and β(2v − 1) = v − 1 (since
2v − 1 is odd). We wish to demonstrate that β(2v + 1) = v (i.e. the bidding function does
not increase).
To do so, let us suppose (for contradiction) that β(2v+1) 6= v. Since β(2v+1) ≈ (2v+1)/2,
we may apply the no-jumps lemma, which implies that β(2v+ 1) ≤ v+ 1. By monotonicity,
β(v+ 1) ≥ v. Hence, if β(2v+ 1) 6= v, then β(2v+ 1) = v+ 1. Now, in equilibrium, a player
with a value of 2v + 1 must prefer to bid v + 1 than to bid only v, i.e.
pi(2v + 1, v + 1) = v
(
2v + 1 + 0.5#(v + 1)
S
)
≥ pi(2v + 1, v) = (v + 1)
(
2v + 0.5
S
)
where #(v+ 1) denotes the number of values that induce a bid of v+ 1. After some algebra,
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this simplifies to
#(v + 1) ≥ 3 + 1
v
which implies (since v > 0) that #(v + 1) > 3; and therefore (since #(v + 1) is an integer)
that #(v + 1) ≥ 4. Hence, we conclude that there must be at least 4 valuations that induce
a bid of v + 1.
We now argue that this leads to a contradiction. There are two (sub)cases to consider. In
the first case, suppose that 2v + 4 /∈ X (i.e. the value 2v + 1 is sufficiently close to the end
of the bidding function that 2v + 4 exceeds the maximum value). In that case, it is clearly
impossible that #(v+1) ≥ 4 , so we have our contradiction immediately. In the second case,
suppose that 2v + 4 ∈ X and consider the situation when v = 2v + 4. We claim that such a
bidder would be made strictly better off by bidding 1 more:
pi(2v + 4, v + 2) ≥ (v + 2)
(
2v + 1 + #(v + 1)
S
)
>
pi(2v + 4, v + 1) = (v + 3)
(
2v + 1 + 0.5#(v + 1)
S
)
which simplifies to
#(v + 1)(v + 1) > 4v + 2
which holds since #(v + 1) ≥ 4. Since this deviation is profitable, there is no SE in which
β(2v + 1) = v + 1, implying that β(2v + 1) = v. This concludes the proof for the odd case.
Second case: the value is even. Let us denote the value by 2v. Since β(v) = bv/2c holds up
to 2v − 1, we know that β(2v − 1) = β(2v − 2) = v − 1 (since 2v − 2 is even). We wish to
show that β(2v) = v (i.e. the bidding function increases).
To do this, suppose (for contradiction) that β(2v) 6= v. By monotonicity and no-jumps, it
must be that β(2v) = v − 1. Again, there are now two (sub)cases to consider. In the first
case, suppose that 2v + 1 ∈ X (i.e., 2v is not the final value). In that case, we claim that a
player with a value of 2v would be made strictly better off by deviating to a bid of v:
pi(2v, v − 1) = (v + 1)
(
2v − 2 + 0.5#(v − 1)
S
)
< pi(2v, v) = v
(
2v − 2 + #(v − 1) + 0.5#(v)
S
)
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which holds if and only if
4v − 4 < v#(v) + (v + 1)#(v − 1). (10)
Since β(2v − 2) = β(2v − 1) = β(2v) = v − 1, it must be that #(v − 1) ≥ 3. Moreover, the
value 2v+1 ∈ X; and either β(2v+1) = v−1 or β(2v+1) = v. Thus, either #(v−1) ≥ 4, or
otherwise #(v− 1) ≥ 3 and #(v) ≥ 1. Either way, (10) holds, confirming that the deviation
is strictly profitable.
In the next (sub)case, suppose that 2v is the final value. In that case, we claim that a player
with a value of 2v − 3 would want to deviate to bidding one more (i.e. v − 1):
pi(2v − 3, v − 1) = (v − 2)
(
2v − 2 + 1.5
S
)
> pi(2v − 3, v − 2) = (v − 1)
(
2v − 4 + 1
S
)
which holds for all v > 4 (and thus all v ≥ 5). Since 2v is (by assumption) the maximum
bid, the profitability of the deviation is thus ensured by our assumption that the number of
values is at least 10. 
Corollary 14 If x ≥ 10, there is no SE in the first-price auction with 2 bidders and an even
maximum value.
Proof. From the previous, any SE must have the form β(v) = bv/2c. However, consider the
situation when v = x (the maximum). Equilibrium play calls for b = 0.5x, so the equilibrium
payoff is
x
2
(
x
x+ 1
+
1
2(x+ 1)
)
However, if the player deviated to b = 0.5x− 1, they would get(
x
2
+ 1
)(
x− 2
x+ 1
+
1
x+ 1
)
It can be shown that the latter quantity is strictly larger assuming that x ≥ 5. Thus, there
is no SE in which β(v) = bv/2c – and therefore no SE at all. 
Finally, we will now briefly summarise our results for the case of n = 3 (the calculations are
available upon the request). Suppose that x ≥ 10. Then:
1. If the x is a multiple of 3, there is no SE.
2. Otherwise, there is a SE in which all players set β(v) = (2/3)v, β(v+ 1) = (2/3)v and
β(v + 2) = (2/3)v + 1 for every v that is a multiple of 3.
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Like our analysis of the model without ties, this again emphasises the fact that non-existence
of SE is common once auctions are made discrete.
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